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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis analyzes the Law of the River’s normative foundation and 
recommends how the foundation ought to be restructured in light of climate change and 
to effectively address the over-appropriation of the Colorado River’s water and the 
deterioration of the Colorado River’s ecosystem. Guided by the assumptions and 
principles of policy design, the thesis examines events leading up to the Colorado River 
Compact of 1922’s approval, the Law of the River’s keystone law, to determine the 
Compact’s inherent normative argument. Concluding the Compact implicitly integrates 
the American west’s dominant water allocation system, an analysis is conducted to show 
how prior appropriation is representative of the market paradigm. Recognizing the market 
paradigm cannot adequately address the Colorado River River’s current predicament, the 
thesis proceeds to demonstrate John Wesley Powell’s alternative settlement system for 
western America as fundamentally representative of the market paradigm. This 
understanding contrasts with the assumption made prior to analysis that his system 
represented an integrated normative theory which compensated for the market paradigm’s 
inadequacies. With the nullification of John Wesley Powell, the thesis proceeds to 
illustrate how the Balinese Hindu philosophy Tri Hita Karana represents the complex 
reasoning needed to serve as the basis for alternative Law to manage the Colorado River. 
From a paradigm of the philosophy showing how Tri Hita Karana effectively 
compensates for the market paradigm’s inadequacies, a list of provisions is recommended 
that ought to be included in a revised Colorado River Compact grounded in a complex 
normative theory similar to Tri Hita Karana.  
 2 
Introduction 
 Spanning 243,000 m2 of North America, the Colorado River and its tributaries 
form the Colorado River Basin1 and are the lifeblood of the southwest.2 Fed largely by 
snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains, water from the Colorado River and its tributaries 
has historically supported an abundance of human and nonhuman activity.3 Thirty-six 
million people living within and outside the Basin receive part or all of their drinking 
water from the Colorado River or its tributaries.4 Nearly 5.7 million acres of farmland are 
irrigated with the River’s water to produce 15% of the nation’s crops and 13% of its 
livestock.5 Multiple hydroelectric plants built on the River and its tributaries supply 
electricity to western residents.6 The River and the riparian zone that parallels it support 
65% of the American west’s fauna and flora species, which in turn support a $26 billion 
recreational and tourist industry.7 In addition to supporting U.S. municipal, agricultural, 
                                                            
1 Hereafter the Colorado River Basin will be used interchangeably with “the Basin” and “the Region.” 
2 Brendan P. Boepple, “The Colorado River Basin: An Overview by the State of the Rockies Project 2011-
12 Research Team,” in The 2012 Colorado College State of the Rockies Report Card: The Colorado River 
Basin: Agenda for Use, Restoration, and Sustainability for the Next Generation, ed. by Walter E. Hecox, 
Brendan P. Boepple, and Matthew C. Gottfried (Colorado Springs, CO: Colorado College, 2012), 25. 
3 Carson McMurray, “The Colorado River Basin and Climate: Perfect Storm for the Twenty-First 
Century?,” The 2012 Colorado College State of the Rockies Report Card: The Colorado River Basin: 
Agenda for Use, Restoration, and Sustainability for the Next Generation, ed. by Walter E. Hecox, Brendan 
P. Boepple, and Matthew C. Gottfried (Colorado Springs, CO: Colorado College, 2012), 110; Boepple, 
“The Colorado River Basin,” 25. 
4 American Rivers and Western Resource Advocates, The Hardest Working River in the West: Common-
Sense Solutions for a Reliable Water Future for the Colorado River Basin (Washington, D.C.: American 
Rivers, 2014), 2. Hereafter the “Colorado River” will be used interchangeably with “the River” and “the 
Colorado.” 
5 American Rivers, The Hardest Working River in the West, 2; Sally Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, 
and Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion: Is it a Zero Sum Game?,” in The 2012 Colorado 
College State of the Rockies Report Card: The Colorado River Basin: Agenda for Use, Restoration, and 
Sustainability for the Next Generation, ed. by Walter E. Hecox, Brendan P. Boepple, and Matthew C. 
Gottfried (Colorado Springs, CO: Colorado College, 2012), 43. 
6 American Rivers, The Hardest Working River in the West, 2. 
7 Natalie Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” in The 2012 Colorado 
College State of the Rockies Report Card: The Colorado River Basin: Agenda for Use, Restoration, and 
Sustainability for the Next Generation, ed. by Walter E. Hecox, Brendan P. Boepple, and Matthew C. 
Gottfried (Colorado Springs, CO: Colorado College, 2012), 89; American Rivers, The Hardest Working 
River in the West, 2. 
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environmental, and recreational purposes, the Colorado River also supports Mexico’s 
“agricultural, cultural, environmental, and municipal water needs.”8 Amidst this human 
and nonhuman activity, the Colorado River Basin’s health is deteriorating. 
 
 Since October 1999 the Colorado River Basin has been in a state of drought, with 
decreased precipitation in the Rockies and increased average temperatures in the Basin 
causing the River’s average annual flow to decrease from its 1906-2005 average of 15.1 
million acre-feet (maf) to its 2000-2008 average of 11.7 maf.9 Not only are higher 
                                                            
8 American Rivers, The Hardest Working River in the West, 2. 
9 Jonathan Waterman, “The American Nile,” National Geographic, accessed April 7, 2016, 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/americannile/; Boepple, “The Colorado River Basin,” 26; McMurray, 
“The Colorado River Basin and Climate,” 112. 
Figure 1: The Law of 
the River, which 
manages the Colorado 
River and the entire 
Colorado River Basin, 
has contributed to the 
Colorado River’s over-
appropriation and its 
ecosystem’s 
deterioration.  
Reprinted from the 
public domain, by 
Shannon, New Map of 
Colorado River 
Watershed, April 28, 
2012, Wikimedia 
Commons, accessed 
June 17, 2016, 
https://commons.wikime
dia.org/wiki/Category:C
olorado_River#/media/F
ile:Coloradorivermapne
w1.jpg. 
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temperatures leading to less snowmelt in the Basin’s headwaters and decreased River 
flow but higher temperatures are also evaporating more of the Region’s remaining water, 
further contributing to the Basin’s deterioration and prolonging the drought.10 And 
drought is expected to become more common in the Basin as scientists predict the Region 
will become drier in the future, drier than even the megadroughts of the 12th, 13th, and 
14th centuries.11 With the global temperature expected to increase 1.7 degrees Celsius by 
2055, snow water content in the headwaters predicted to decrease 29% by 2055, and 
runoff expected to decrease 18% by the mid-21st century, the Colorado River’s average 
annual flow is predicted to decrease between 15% and 20%.12 Despite the drought’s 
negative impact on the Basin’s water supplies, the Region’s deterioration is largely the 
outcome of human laws.13  
 An assortment of regulatory guidelines, federal laws, court decisions, compacts, 
and contracts collectively known as the Law of the River14 has governed the Basin since 
1922, beginning with the Colorado River Compact of 1922.15 Since the Compact, the 
Law has fostered human consumption of the Region’s water by promoting agriculture, 
industry, urbanization, and power generation in and around the Basin while disregarding 
                                                            
10 McMurray, “The Colorado River Basin and Climate,” 116 and 120. 
11 Benjamin I. Cook, Toby R. Ault, and Jason E. Smerdon, “Unprecedented 21st Century Drought Risk in 
the American Southwest and Central Plains,” Science Advances 1, no. 1 (February 2015): 6, accessed April 
7, 2016, http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/1/1/e1400082.full.pdf+html. 
12 McMurray, “The Colorado River Basin and Climate,” 113-118. 
13 Warren King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin: Obsolete or Flexible for a Sustainable Future?,” in 
The 2012 Colorado College State of the Rockies Report Card: The Colorado River Basin: Agenda for Use, 
Restoration, and Sustainability for the Next Generation, ed. by Walter E. Hecox, Brendan P. Boepple, and 
Matthew C. Gottfried (Colorado Springs, CO: Colorado College, 2012), 60. 
14 Hereafter the Law of the River will be used interchangeably with “the Law.” 
15 “The Law of the River,” U.S. Department of the Interior: Bureau of Reclamation: Lower Colorado 
Region, last modified March 2008, accessed April 7, 2016, 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html. Hereafter, the 1922 Colorado River Compact will be 
used interchangeably with “the Compact.”  
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the Basin’s ecological need for water.16 Drafted on the assumption the River’s average 
annual flow was 15 maf, the Law’s emphasis on human consumption has led to the 
River’s over-appropriation as its flow has varied considerably from as much as 25.5 maf 
to as little as 5.5 maf, with recent flows being well below the Compact’s assumed 
average flow.17 With the number of people dependent on Colorado River water growing 
and the Law remaining focused on human consumption, the River is overwhelmingly 
being utilized to support human activity while depriving the Region’s fauna and flora of 
the water needed to thrive.18  
 Preoccupation with enabling human activity in the Region means the Law and 
subsequent infrastructure have denied the riparian zone of water and nutrients needed to 
support the Region’s flora and fauna.19 Prior to the Law’s creation, the River carried and 
deposited throughout the Basin silt and sediment that is the basis for the riparian zone, 
enabling the growth of the Region’s native flora that in turn supported the Region’s 
fauna.20 However the construction of dams to enable agriculture, industry, and other 
forms of human activity has blocked the natural deposition of silt and sediment that has 
contributed to the disappearance of the Basin’s native flora, such as cottonwood and 
willows that in turn have led to the disappearance of insect and songbird species.21 
Furthermore, the construction of dams and reservoirs has disrupted flow patterns vital to 
                                                            
16 Boepple, “The Colorado River Basin,” 30; Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West: The Colorado River 
Compact and the Politics of Water in the American West, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2009), 355-356. Tree ring data analysis has determined the Compact was drafted during the Basin’s 
wettest ten-year period since record keeping had begun in 1899. Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, and 
Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion,” 34; Hundley, Jr., Water and the West, 193. 
17 King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 62; McMurray, “The Colorado River Basin and Climate,” 
112. 
18 Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, and Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion,” 46; 
Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 89. 
19 Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 89. 
20 Ibid., 90. 
21 Hundley, Jr., Water and the West, 348. 
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the Region’s aquatic life, endangering multiple fish species while in general diminishing 
the amount of water available to all of the Basin’s flora and fauna.22 A steady increase in 
the Region’s temperatures has compounded the decline of native flora and fauna by 
altering hydrologic patterns essential to their survival, such as diminishing runoff from 
the River’s headwaters and shifting annual peak runoff to an earlier time in the year.23 
With the Region expected to become drier in the future and the Law currently centered 
on satisfying peoples’ materialistic preferences, the Basin’s flora and fauna are under 
considerable pressure to adapt to a changing climate while overall populations continue 
to decline as a result of being denied sufficient nutrients and water. 
 In light of the Colorado River Basin’s current and future predicament, the Law 
needs to be altered to allow the Region’s ecosystem24 to recover while continuing to 
permit human activity in and around the Basin, activities that will need to adapt to drier 
conditions. When a law is unable to achieve its objective, normal procedure includes 
conducting a technical analysis “using empirical assumptions and quantitative tools” to 
quantify the effects of the insufficient law and pinpointing the effects’ origins within the 
law itself before refining it.25 Or in the Law’s case, the Compact’s ambiguities permitted 
more detailed compacts, legislation, court rulings, contracts, and guidelines to be drafted 
that remained within the Compact’s framework and fostered economic development in 
the Basin.26 The 2007 Interim Shortage Guidelines, the latest addition to the Law, reflect 
                                                            
22 Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 94. 
23 Ibid., 93. 
24 Hereafter ecosystem will refer to the flora and fauna who live in the Colorado River Basin and depend on 
the River’s water for survival. 
25 John Martin Gillroy, Breena Holland, and Celia Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design: 
Understanding the Use of Principle & Argument in Environmental & Natural Resource Law (St. Paul, MN: 
Thomson/West, 2008), 15. 
26 Hundley, Jr., Water and the West, xv; King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 72. 
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adjusting the Law to continue furthering economic development in the Basin by 
prescribing how to distribute the River’s water in times of drought.27 The current 
approach to analyzing law and intent to readjust the Law to continue encouraging human 
activity in the Basin represents how market assumptions and tools underlie the analysis 
and creation of the Law.28 In readjusting the Law to meet human consumptive designs for 
water, lawmakers are confining themselves to the assumptions and principles of classical 
economics, reflecting a focus on the water’s economic instrumental value.29 Yet since the 
1980s, concern for the Basin’s ecological health has risen and led to calls for instream 
flows to meet its environmental needs.30 Given the ongoing dilemma of decreasing water 
supplies, increasing human demand, and growing push for instream flows, stakeholders 
such as Natalie Triedman have called for “a fundamental shift in our discourse that 
provides new ways of thinking about water supply strategies that do not jeopardize [the 
Basin’s] environmental needs.”31 Policy design is an alternative approach to analyzing 
and creating law that can generate “new ways of thinking about water supply strategies 
that do not jeopardize [the Basin’s] environmental needs.”32 
 Whereas market assumptions are the basis for traditional law-making and 
analysis, policy design assumes argument comprised of normative theory, normative 
                                                            
27 Boepple, “The Colorado River Basin,” 29. 
28 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 14 and 15. 
29 Ibid., 14 and 4. 
30 King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 58; Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado 
River Basin,” 103. 
31 Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 103. 
32 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 15; Triedman, “Environment 
and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 89. 
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principle, and material conditions (experience) is the foundation of law.33 From this 
assumption comes the understanding that any integrated normative theory can be codified 
into eventual law.34 “In contrast to the one-size-fits-all approach of market analysis as 
policy and legal decision-making,” policy design “create[s] a dynamic environment that 
integrates various values and principles” to generate various normative arguments that 
become the basis for new law and redefine the relationship between humanity and the 
natural world.35 Policy design achieves this objective via the inductive and deductive 
process Comprehensive Policy Argument (CPA) (Figure 2), which compels the lawmaker 
to decipher an existing law’s underlying normative argument, analyze the argument’s 
insufficiencies, and formulate an alternative normative argument that compensates for the 
status-quo’s insufficiencies.36 By determining an insufficient law’s inherent normative 
argument and accepting any pre-existing integrated normative theory (that compensates 
for the status-quo) can be codified into a paradigm and serve as the beginning for 
alternative law, policy design and CPA can create new “water supply strategies that do 
not jeopardize [the Basin’s] environmental needs.”37 The application of CPA to the Law 
will require ascertaining the Law’s inherent normative argument and understanding how 
the argument needs to be altered to allow the Basin’s ecosystem to recover while 
continuing to enable human activity in the Basin despite projected drier conditions. 
                                                            
33 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 15; John Martin Gillroy, 
Justice & Nature: Kantian Philosophy, Environmental Policy, and the Law (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2000), 3. 
34 Gillroy, Justice & Nature, 14. 
35 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 15 and 11. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Gillroy, Justice & Nature, 14; Triedman, “Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin,” 103. 
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Figure 2: The diagram and subsequent explanation outline Comprehensive Policy Argument (CPA), 
policy design’s approach to analyzing and creating law. This diagram and explanation have been 
reprinted with permission from Dr. John Martin Gillroy, author of Justice & Nature: Kantian 
Philosophy, Environmental Policy, & the Law and Professor of International Legal Philosophy and 
Comparative Environmental Policy & Law at Lehigh University. Unless otherwise specified, all 
subsequent diagrams and pictures in this thesis have been reprinted with permission from Dr. Gillroy. 
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 While the Law’s pluralistic nature appears incompatible with CPA, the Law’s 
origins in the Colorado River Compact of 1922 means fundamentally altering the Law 
must begin with altering the Compact.38 The Compact’s placement into Step A, 
Component 3 of CPA’s more detailed inductive and deductive process (Figure 3) 
compels the lawmaker to decipher what are the Compact’s, and thereby the Law’s, 
fundamental (normative) assumption(s), (normative) operating principle(s), material 
condition(s), maxim(s), and method(s).39 An examination of the events leading up to the 
Compact’s adoption by the Colorado River Commissioners demonstrates the market 
paradigm is the normative foundation of the Compact and the Law. Grounded in classical 
economics, the market paradigm’s assumption of the individual as a selfish consumer 
concerned with maximizing his material welfare explains the Law’s emphasis on 
economic development and economic instrumental valuation of the Basin.40 Altering the 
Law so it moves beyond exclusive economic instrumental valuation of the Basin and 
instead also accommodates its intrinsic value41 will require turning to an alternative 
integrated normative theory that assumes the individual is more than “a self-interested 
welfare maximizer.”42 
 
                                                            
38 Hundley, Jr., Water and the West, xiv. 
39 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 16. With policy design there 
are three fundamental assumptions or levels of analysis that are of concern: assumptions (characterizations) 
about the individual, community/collective action, and the just state. 
40 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 169. 
41 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 5. Based on A Primer for 
Law & Policy Design, this thesis defines intrinsic value as referring to the Basin’s ecosystem (flora and 
fauna) being able to exist and flourish with minimal interference by humanity. 
42 King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 54; Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law 
& Policy Design, 158. 
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 Marc Reisner’s characterization of John Wesley Powell as possessing the 
scientific detachment, insight, and wisdom to accurately predict the negative outcome of 
western land laws conceived on the basis of lousy science, wishful thinking, and 
willfulness led to the assumption that Powell’s ideas represented a normative theory, 
Figure 3 is a more detailed layout and exposition of CPA. This thesis focuses primarily on Step A, 
Component 3.  
 12 
which could serve as an alternative normative basis for law to govern the Basin.43 Having 
explored the Colorado River twice and conducted extensive surveys of western America, 
it was presumed A Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, With a 
More Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah articulated ideas representing a normative 
theory that accounted for nature’s intrinsic value.44 However, while Powell superficially 
characterizes the individual as an unselfish consumer, which leads to the assumption 
about collective action resembling the coordination game, he is not fundamentally 
different from the market paradigm.45 An analysis of Report on the Lands of the Arid 
Region of the United States46 and three Century Magazine articles that built on the report 
reveal Powell does not evolve from simple reasoning to the complex reasoning that can 
account for the Basin’s intrinsic value.47 Despite articulating ideas seemingly different 
from the status-quo, Powell’s ideas are still inherently grounded in classical economics.48 
 Tri Hita Karana, the philosophy underlying the Subak cooperative water 
management system of Bali, exemplifies a normative theory needed to compensate for 
the market paradigm’s insufficiencies.49 While the philosophy mirrors the market 
paradigm’s concern for individual welfare, Tri Hita Karana’s assumption of the 
                                                            
43 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, Rev. ed. (New York 
City, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), 24 and 43. 
44 Robert L. Dorman, A Word for Nature: Four Pioneering Environmental Advocates, 1845-1913 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 181, 189-190. 
45 John Wesley Powell, Seeing Things Whole: The Essential John Wesley Powell, ed. William deBuys 
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press / Shearwater Books, 2001), 308. 
46 Hereafter the report will be referred to as Report on the Lands. 
47 Powell, Seeing Things Whole, 15; Gillroy, Justice & Nature, 219. 
48 Lisi Krall, “US Land Policy and the Commodification of Arid Land (1862-1920),” Journal of Economic 
Issues 35, no. 3 (Sept 2001): 662, accessed February 6, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4227695.pdf?_=1461190017645. 
49 “Cultural Landscape of Bali Province: The Subak System as a Manifestation of the Tri Hita Karana 
Philosophy,” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, last modified 2012, accessed February 9, 2016, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1194. 
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individual needing to maintain harmony with the spiritual realm,50 other people, and 
nature to achieve prosperity moves beyond the market paradigm’s assumption of a selfish 
individual and his/her isolated economic instrumental valuation of nature.51 The notion of 
needing to attain harmony with the spiritual realm to attain prosperity makes the 
philosophy incompatible with American political and religious culture and unsuitable as 
an alternative normative basis for alternative Law to govern the Colorado River. 
However, the assumption that individual prosperity/welfare52 is a product of maintaining 
harmonious relations with others and nature are characteristics which ought to be part of 
a normative theory that can compensate for the market paradigm’s insufficiencies. As the 
Basin deteriorates from unchecked human activity that is inconsiderate of the impact on 
the Region’s ecosystem, a normative theory which encourages an individual to achieve 
harmony with others and nature can serve as an alternative normative basis for law that 
would allow the Basin’s ecosystem to recover while still permitting human activity, even 
against the backdrop of increasingly drier conditions. 
 In his overview of the Law of the River, Warren King writes, “More so than 
precipitation patterns and seasonal snowmelt, human laws and resulting actions largely 
define conditions upon which the basin’s survival depends.”53 As the status-quo, classical 
economics and its manifestation in the Law of the River have resulted in the Colorado 
                                                            
50 Unlike Judeo-Christian tradition, which emphasizes worship of one all-powerful God, the Balinese 
worship a pantheon of deities. Thus, to be in harmony with the spiritual realm means being in harmony 
with the deities who comprise the Balinese pantheon. J. Stephen Lansing, “Balinese ‘Water Temples’ and 
the Management of Irrigation,” American Anthropologist 89, no. 2 (Jun 1987): 330, accessed August 6, 
2016, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/677758.pdf?_=1470524486134. 
51 Jan Hendrik Peters and Wisnu Wardana, Tri Hita Karana: The Spirit of Bali, ed. Andya Primanda 
(Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2013), 81; Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for 
Law & Policy Design, 18. 
52 Hereafter prosperity and welfare will be used interchangeably since both have similar meanings and are 
the focus of classical economics and Tri Hita Karana. 
53 King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 60. 
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River Basin’s ecological deterioration and tension growing among those dependent on 
the River; policy design offers the prospect of effectively responding to the Basin’s 
predicament by integrating different normative theories that can compensate for the 
status-quo’s inadequacies and serve as the basis for alternative Law to manage the Basin. 
This thesis shows how some of policy design’s fundamental rules and assumptions would 
materialize in the context of the Law of the River. Chapter One shows how the Law is 
reflective of the market paradigm and what are the inadequacies that necessitate an 
alternative normative theory serve as the basis for alternative Law to manage the 
Colorado River Basin.54 Chapter Two shows how John Wesley Powell and his ideas are 
normatively not so different from the economic forces he was supposedly against. 
Chapter Three focuses on how a paradigm of the Tri Hita Karana philosophy embodies 
assumptions that compensate for the market paradigm’s inadequacies. Chapter Four 
recommends a set of provisions that ought to be included in a revised Colorado River 
Compact grounded in a normative theory similar to Tri Hita Karana’s emphasis on 
individuals having harmonious relations with others and nature. 
Chapter One 
 In one of North America’s driest regions, the Law of the River has governed how 
water from the Colorado River Basin is distributed and consumed since 1922.55 Despite 
its seeming complexity with various detailed federal, state, and local laws, the Colorado 
River Compact of 1922 is the heart of the Law. Described by Brendan Boepple as the 
Law’s keystone, the Compact established the framework that has since directed water 
                                                            
54 Unless specified differently, “the paradigm” will refer to and be used interchangeably with “the market 
paradigm.” 
55 King, “Laws of the Colorado River Basin,” 53 and 54. 
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allocations and utilization in the Region.56 Generated in an era when there was no legal 
precedent for reserving water for instream flows (leaving water in the riverbed) and tree 
ring data analysis was unavailable to document the historic occurrences of prolonged 
droughts in the Basin, the Compact has never been altered to account for the Basin’s 
intrinsic value or to readjust water allocations to drought conditions.57 Though the 
Interim Shortage Guidelines represent the Law’s acknowledgment of the current drought, 
the guidelines focus on how water should be allocated in light of reduced supply to 
continue enabling economic activity in the Region, thus remaining within the Compact’s 
framework of ignoring the Basin’s intrinsic value.58 To fundamentally alter the Law in 
light of anticipated drier conditions while balancing the Basin’s intrinsic value with the 
desire to maintain economic activity in the Basin requires altering the Compact itself. 
 An interstate treaty among the U.S. states59 of Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, the Compact divided the Basin into an upper 
basin (consisting of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and lower basin 
(consisting of Arizona, California, and Nevada).60 In terms of allocating the Basin’s 
water, the Compact allocates 7.5 maf annually to both the upper and lower basins.61 
However, Article III, paragraph (d) obligates the upper basin (where the headwaters are 
situated) to ensure the lower basin receives an aggregate of 75 maf for any ten year 
period (roughly 7.5 maf annually), burdening the upper basin with the prospect of 
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lessening its own consumption during drought to guarantee the lower basin its allocated 
share.62 In terms of consumption, the Compact specifies River water is to be used for 
agriculture, navigation, electric power generation, and domestic purposes, which includes 
uses “for household, stock, municipal, mining, milling, industrial, and other like 
purposes.”63 The Compact also specifies power generation takes precedence over 
navigation and agricultural and domestic uses takes precedence over power generation.64 
Because the Compact has never been amended, these provisions remain in effect despite 
increasing calls for instream flows for the Basin’s environmental needs and climatic 
conditions reducing the River’s flow, which will eventually impact consumption patterns 
and ought to be borne equally among the sub-basins. Left unspecified but understood by 
the document’s framers and Basin stakeholders was the tactic to employ to allocate the 
River’s water within the sub-basins.65 It’s in understanding this tactic that we move 
towards recognizing how the market paradigm is the status-quo strategy underlying the 
Compact and needs to be altered in light of the Colorado River Basin’s current and future 
predicament. 
 Whereas the Compact can be said to represent the existing law in component (a) 
of CPA from figure 2, prior appropriation can be said to represent the broader tactic and 
transition to the strategy that underlies the Compact. The dominant means of allocating 
water rights in western America, utilization of the prior appropriation doctrine66 to 
allocate River water within the sub-basins was established via the 1922 U.S. Supreme 
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Court case Wyoming v. Colorado.67 To resolve Wyoming’s and Colorado’s dispute over 
how to allocate water from the interstate Laramie River, the Supreme Court reasoned 
since both states enforced the doctrine within their own borders, the doctrine extended to 
the Laramie River.68 Since the Court ruled interstate rivers flowing through prior 
appropriation states had to be allocated utilizing the doctrine, the Colorado River had to 
be allocated via prior appropriation since all Basin states adhered to the doctrine.69 The 
Basin’s division and the allocation of 7.5 maf to each sub-basin reflected Basin states’ 
fears, particularly the upper basin’s, that if the entire Basin were to be allocated on the 
basis of the doctrine, California would receive most of the Region’s water.70 The Basin’s 
division and the equal apportionment of water to each sub-basin was meant to minimize 
this prospect by incorporating into the Compact provisions that would decrease the 
impact of the Supreme Court’s decision.71 While these provisions achieved their purpose, 
the Compact still adhered to Wyoming v. Colorado by implicitly requiring the sub-basins 
to apply the doctrine within their respective borders, as Norris Hundley, Jr. illustrates in 
his recounting of the events leading up to Arizona’s approval of the document.72 “The 
compact, if approved, would repeal the law of prior appropriation between the basins, 
thus protecting the upper states from faster developing California. But the compact would 
offer no such protection to Arizona. The law of prior appropriation would continue to 
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operate within each basin.”73 The Compact’s implicit incorporation of prior 
appropriation, made possible because all the Basin states had already been enforcing the 
doctrine within their own borders, speaks to its prevalence in western America. The 
doctrine’s widespread acceptance can be attributed to a set of easy-to-understand 
principles that constitute a strategy broader in scope than the Compact itself. 
 Originating in California’s gold mines to resolve disputes over water rights 
needed for mining, the doctrine first attained legal recognition via the 1855 California 
Supreme Court case Irwin v. Phillips.74 Other western courts subsequently recognized 
and began administering the doctrine before Congress recognized it in 1866.75 Though 
the Basin states had been administering the doctrine differently prior to the Compact’s 
adoption, they all adhered to the doctrine’s fundamental principles, which are outlined by 
Hundley.76 “Water rights could be acquired only by those who actually appropriated the 
water and continued to use it beneficially and in reasonable amounts. Priority of right 
went to users in the order in which they made their appropriations. The right to water was 
usufructuary only, since, as in the riparian system, no one could own the corpus of the 
water itself.”77 Furthermore, water rights could be lost if the particular use ceased and the 
use itself could occur anywhere, meaning water could be transported outside the stream’s 
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watershed.78 Barton Thompson, Jr. also observes the doctrine “rejects any notion of 
equitable sharing of water, such as reducing appropriations pro-rata during drought.”79 
Stemming from prioritizing rights according to when the water was first put to use, the 
doctrine allocated water to the most senior right holders first before those with junior 
rights in times of drought, regardless of the use’s nature.80 Use of water is the basis for 
the doctrine’s principles and reflects the normative argument that is the essence of the 
Law. The widespread acceptance of the doctrine’s principles represents an acceptance of 
experiences, a normative operating principle, and ultimately normative assumptions that 
were perceived as being true. 81 
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Figure 4: The normative argument (paradigm) that underlies most of today’s environmental 
laws, the market paradigm’s characterization of the individual as a self-interested consumer 
is the primary cause of the Basin’s deterioration.  
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 Classical economics’ assumption of the individual as “a self-interested welfare 
maximizer concerned with little but personal [material] satisfaction” forms the 
cornerstone of the market paradigm (Figure 4) and thereby the doctrine, the Compact, 
and the Law.82 Based on this characterization of the individual, the doctrine, the 
Compact, and Law are codified in a manner that represents “the consumer’s ‘willingness-
to-pay’ for a benefit that reflects his or her self-defined welfare preferences.”83 Recalling 
prior appropriation was conceived to resolve disputes over water needed to mine for gold, 
gold was the welfare preference and the only way to attain gold was to use water. Since 
gold could increase a person’s material welfare, those who were the first to use a water 
source to mine for gold were able to maximize their welfare the most. In appropriating 
the water, the doctrine is reflective of enabling individuals to use water to achieve their 
material preferences. The assumption that law is created to allow the individual to satisfy 
his/her material preferences is found in the Compact’s provisions mandating River water 
be used exclusively for agriculture, domestic purposes, power generation, and navigation. 
These provisions reflect the framers’ and their constituents’ desire to use water to 
increase their material welfare. Not only does the assumption of the individual as a 
selfish consumer establish the nature of the forthcoming market paradigm but the 
assumption also influences the assumptions made about the community and collective 
action. 
 Building upon the characterization of the individual, the market paradigm 
assumes the community “is no more than the aggregate sum of individual wants and 
preferences” and that collective action “is primarily concerned with establishing just 
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enough cooperation to satisfy the material interests of the most people possible without 
force or fraud connected to trade.”84 Creating a situation analogous to the prisoner’s 
dilemma, which stems from the individual’s selfish nature, the situation is resolved via 
the “invisible hand” (nature) that will coordinate selfish pursuits toward the collective 
well-being.85 The market paradigm’s characterization of community and collective action 
is underscored in S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup’s short passage on how the doctrine came into 
existence, “The miners helped themselves to the land, the gold, and the water needed to 
work the claims. To achieve order and some form of property rights, they established and 
enforced rules and regulations governing the acquisition and holding of mining claims, 
based upon priority of discovery and diligence in working the claims.”86 Descriptors like 
the first sentence and “some form of property rights” highlight society was seen in 
materialistic terms with individuals concerned with protecting material possessions, and 
pursuing their materialistic interests, thus underscoring the notion that community was no 
more than a collection of individuals’ materialistic wants and preferences. The 
assumption that individuals’ selfish pursuit of gold naturally benefited all of society is 
reflected in a comment California’s military governor Colonel Mason made in 1848, 
during the doctrine’s infancy, “‘as the Government is benefit by your [referring to the 
miners] getting out the gold, I do not intend to interfere.’”87 Since the Government 
represents the public’s interests, the selfish consumption of water for the pursuit of gold 
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meant the rest of the country benefited from this consumption and pursuit. With the 
invisible hand ensuring individual appropriations of water for the pursuit of gold 
benefited everyone, prior appropriation was a sure water allocation system for western 
America and the rest of the country.  
 From the assumption that the community is an aggregate of consumers in pursuit 
of their preferences comes the assumption that a just state “maintain[s] existing markets, 
the property of the individual, and her right to trade it.”88 The assumption that the state 
ought to sustain those “background legal institutions that protect market exchange” is 
evidenced in western states sanctioning prior appropriation. “The [prior] appropriation 
system thus evolved in California was adopted in the other mining states and territories, 
and it spread to still other western jurisdictions."89 The system previously described by 
Ciriacy-Wantrup as where “the miners helped themselves to the land, the gold, and the 
water needed to work the claims” and formulated rules to protect these claims represents 
the market in that the miners were interacting with each other and the land to obtain what 
they wanted and abided by rules they themselves created to legitimize their 
“purchases.”90 Western states’ adoption of this system means they did not disrupt the 
existing market, thus staying true to classical economics’ assumption of a just state. Nor 
did the federal government disrupt the existing market as reflected in the federal Mining 
Act of 1877, which sanctioned the system.91 Western states’ and the federal government’s 
legal acceptance of the doctrine reflects the assumption that a just state “facilitate[s] 
want-satisfaction and regulate[s] behavior only to further this end” by allowing the 
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system to continue operating as it was, thereby giving miners reassurances their water 
and mining claims would not be invalidated by the state or federal government, which 
permitted miners to continue satisfying their materialistic preference for gold.92  
 Miners’ satisfaction of their preference for gold, possible only from consuming 
water, is reflective of the market paradigm’s operating principle Kaldor efficiency. 
Derived from the fundamental assumptions and defining what is right in the eventual law, 
Kaldor efficiency says “a new state of affairs is now efficient if the winners gain enough 
[wealth] that they could ‘hypothetically’ compensate the losers and make everyone as 
well off or better off,” meaning the benefits of an action need to outweigh the costs to 
ensure collective wealth is maximized.93 In the dry west where water was initially needed 
for mining gold and later enabled agriculture and other forms of development, those who 
possessed water rights were the winners and those without water rights were the losers.94 
However, prior appropriation stimulated economic development, generated revenue, and 
prosperity that would not have been possible if water was left in its source, which means 
society as whole was better off from water’s appropriation. The mining industry’s annual 
generation of $40-$60 million (in 1850s dollars) in gold for California’s economy 
represents $40-$60 million that would not have been generated without the consumption 
of water, which exemplifies Kaldor efficiency because those with water rights to attain 
gold hypothetically compensated those without water rights and still allowed society to 
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be better off than if the water went unused and gold was not mined.95 Kaldor efficiency 
underlies the Compact in that those who possessed water rights to the Colorado River 
actualized the consumptive uses specified in the document and increased American 
society’s collective wealth, which would not have occurred if the River were allowed to 
flow unused. The utilization of the River’s water for “exclusive beneficial consumptive 
use[s]” such as agriculture, mining, and industry generated revenue and other forms of 
wealth that would not have been possible without utilizing water which means the entire 
country was better off from its consumption.96  
 The doctrine’s and the Compact’s appropriation of water for uses such as mining, 
agriculture, and industry represents the market paradigm’s manipulation of those material 
conditions that will generate wealth.97 Though markets normally monetize property and 
other wealth generating items so they’re accounted for in maximizing wealth, 
appropriation water rights have never been monetized.98 However, water’s necessity to 
activities that are monetized like mining gold, growing crops, and producing electricity 
means the water rights that enable these activities are implicitly monetized. For example, 
Douglas Littlefield’s observation that the gold mining industry annually generated $40-
$60 million for California’s economy in the 1850s means the water rights that generated 
this revenue were worth at least $40-$60 million.99 While the doctrine does not monetize 
water rights, as called for by the market paradigm, the revenue generated from activities 
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dependent on the rights reflects their economic instrumental value. The doctrine reflects 
the market paradigm’s concern for materials that lead to the production of goods and 
maximize wealth because water rights were granted only if the use was beneficial to 
society, as illustrated initially for mining then later for agriculture.100 The Compact’s 
specificity of what constitutes “beneficial consumptive use” aligns with the doctrine’s 
historic tendency of allocating water rights on the basis of uses that would generate 
wealth, further showing the market paradigm is the basis for the doctrine and the Law. 
 In appropriating water for the purposes of generating wealth, the doctrine reflects 
the market paradigm’s maxim of maximizing wealth. Combining the operating principle 
(Kaldor efficiency) and material condition (property), “the maxim seeks a state of affairs 
in which individual willingness-to-pay [representing the individual’s material 
preferences] is properly aggregated and maximized with as little government interference 
and cost to the economy as possible.”101 The state of affairs sought by the maxim is 
reflected in Ciriacy-Wantrup’s recounting of how prior appropriation came into 
existence. “There was no organized government in California mining areas during the 
early years, and little or no law except that made by the miners themselves. The miners 
helped themselves to the land, the gold, and the water needed to work the claims. To 
achieve order and some form of property rights, they established and enforced rules and 
regulations governing the acquisition and holding of mining claims, based upon priority 
of discovery and diligence in working the claims. The same principles were applied to the 
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acquisition of and exercise of rights to the needed water.”102 The doctrine’s genesis 
highlights the doctrine developed without interference from the government and without 
cost to the economy because an economy as thought of today did not exist prior to the 
miners’ arrival. Since the region’s resources had yet to be utilized, miners took what they 
wanted to satisfy their preferences and increase their welfare. Because possession of the 
region’s resources was free and the benefit of obtaining gold was astronomical, miners 
stood to increase their welfare dramatically.103 With miners abiding by simple rules they 
personally created to govern possession of resources that could maximize their welfare, a 
state of affairs was achieved where the aggregated welfare of those in possession of the 
resources and those not in possession of them was maximized. In a region devoid of 
government and without a formal economy, prior appropriation was a product of 
individuals who sought to maximize their welfare by appropriating water to obtain gold 
that naturally maximized collective welfare, thus realizing the market paradigm’s maxim. 
 The representation of the strategic market paradigm’s fundamental assumptions, 
operating principle, material condition, and maxim in the slightly more codified prior 
appropriation culminates with the representation of the paradigm’s methodology within 
the doctrine. Representing the market paradigm in its entirety, the cost-benefit analysis 
subjects a public issue to the Kaldor efficiency test to determine if the benefits (wealth 
preferences) outweigh the costs (wealth preferences not satisfied) and can be obtained 
with minimal government interference.104 The doctrine reflects how the allocation of 
water for mining gold was a benefit that outweighed the costs, which were nonexistent, 
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because the allocation occurred in a context where there was no government or pre-
existing economy, which meant the land’s resources were free and could be allocated in 
any manner locals deemed legitimate. The doctrine represents a system that developed 
independent of government and was motivated by a desire for mineral wealth that 
exceeded any costs involved in obtaining the wealth.105 Given the instrumental value of 
gold, the allocation of water to obtain this mineral more than (hypothetically) 
compensated those who did not possess the water needed to obtain the mineral, thus 
representing how the doctrine operated on the basis of Kaldor efficiency. With miners 
(and later users) needing only to put the water to beneficial use to obtain a right to the 
free resource, prior appropriation enabled wealth to be generated not possible from not 
using the water. The doctrine’s allocation of water rights on the basis of beneficial use 
(initially for mining and later for agriculture and other purposes) represents the market 
paradigm’s methodology of allowing a free resource to be used that economically 
benefits humanity and does not require government regulation. 
 As the doctrine’s, the Compact’s, and the Law’s underlying normative argument, 
the market paradigm’s characterization of the individual contains multiple inadequacies 
that render the argument, and thus the doctrine, the Compact, and the rest of the Law 
incapable of effectively managing the Basin’s current and future predicament. The 
market paradigm’s characterization of the individual as a consumer means the Law does 
not value the Basin beyond its economic instrumental capacity to support and satisfy 
humanity’s material preferences. As evidenced by the doctrine’s allocation of water 
rights only for mining and the Compact’s allocation of the River exclusively for 
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agriculture, domestic, power generation, and navigation purposes, the market paradigm 
does not acknowledge the Basin’s intrinsic value.106 Economic instrumental valuation of 
the River and its tributaries has resulted in total consumption of the Basin’s water, 
leaving insufficient water for the Basin’s ecosystem.107 Without sufficient water, the 
Basin’s ecosystem has steadily deteriorated, as illustrated by the decline of the riparian 
environment that supports a majority of the Region’s fauna and flora.108 Despite calls in 
recent years for instream flows to meet the Basin’s environmental needs, economic 
instrumental valuation of the Basin takes precedence over its intrinsic value because the 
Compact has never been amended to account for the latter value.109 As long as 
satisfaction of the individual’s material preferences remains the normative basis of the 
Compact, the Basin’s intrinsic value will be ignored and its ecosystem will continue 
deteriorating. The shift in public conscious from 1922 when there was no legal precedent 
for allowing instream flows to the present where there is greater concern for the Basin’s 
ecological health necessitates an alternative normative theory that moves beyond valuing 
nature solely for economic instrumental purposes.110 
 Growing tension among the Basin’s users over the River’s remaining water 
requires the individual to be more than a selfish consumer. The market paradigm’s, and 
thus the Law’s, assumption of the individual as a selfish consumer spawned individual 
wealth generating activities that are now competing with each other for the River’s 
remaining water supplies, with individuals from each activity presuming their activity to 
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be the most significant.111 Except for the Compact prioritizing which activities received 
water first, the activities were given no direction on how to proceed forward in their 
development, thereby allowing individuals interested in each activity to selfishly pursue it 
without regard to the activity’s impact on the Basin and without regard to the activity’s 
relation with other activities. In other words, the Compact allowed each activity to 
develop independent of each other, permitting the self-interest of individuals from each 
activity to drive the activity’s expansion and disregard the notion of establishing a 
harmonious relationship with the other activities. The Compact allowing individuals to 
selfishly pursue each activity to satisfy his/her material preferences without coordinating 
their pursuits with each other means that individuals are presently competing with each 
other for the Region’s dwindling water supplies, which is creating tension. Competition 
among farmers, who consume nearly 80% of the Basin’s water to produce 15% of the 
nation’s crops, and urban users, who consume 15% of the Basin’s water and whose 
consumption percentage continues to grow, is creating tension among the two parties, 
with each side arguing its use be given priority.112 In a Region rapidly becoming drier and 
where water is the basis for all wealth generating activities, an alternative normative 
argument is needed for law that will compel individuals to coordinate their activities with 
each other to achieve harmony.  
 And, an alternative normative theory is needed that limits the individual’s desire 
to satisfy his preferences or limits the extent of any activity he/she engages in. In a region 
where water has been over-allocated and demand continues to increase with population 
growth, human activity needs to be managed so the Basin’s carrying capacity is not 
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exceeded.113 An alternative normative theory needs to move beyond the market 
paradigm’s assumption of the individual as “a self-interested welfare maximizer;” the 
characterization of the individual as a maximizer means the individual’s desires and 
capacity to satisfy his/her desires is not restricted.114 The paradigm’s assumption of the 
individual as selfishly focused on maximizing his/her welfare means the individual can 
consume as much of a resource and as many resources as he/she wants to the exclusion of 
others and without consideration of nature. Thus, an alternative normative theory is 
needed that assumes an inherent limitation exists in all human activities, moving beyond 
the market paradigm’s assumption that the goal of law ought to be enabling the individual 
to selfishly increase his/her material welfare as much as possible. 
 The market paradigm’s inability to account for the Basin’s intrinsic value, limit 
the consumption of resources, and consider more than the individual self is reflective of 
simple reasoning. Described as equivalent to desire satisfaction, simple reasoning 
involves decisions being based on maximizing satisfaction of the individual’s desires.115 
Simple reasoning/desire values everything instrumentally and considers only that which 
will lead to the greatest personal welfare.116 In the context of the Colorado River, simple 
reasoning views water in terms of how it can be utilized to satisfy the individual’s 
desire(s) and increase personal welfare. Thus, simple reasoning (and thereby the market 
paradigm) cannot comprehend and effectively respond to the complex problems plaguing 
the Basin; instead; the situation requires a normative theory rooted in complex reasoning. 
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Complex reasoning involves the individual deliberating between instrumental and 
intrinsic values, with neither value entirely dominating the other in the deliberation 
process but rather the process attempting to accommodate both values.117 Since complex 
reasoning entertains the assumption of an entity having instrumental and intrinsic value, a 
normative theory grounded in complex reasoning is needed to move beyond the market 
paradigm’s economic instrumental valuation of the Basin for the purposes of satisfying 
the individual’s selfish desires. 
Chapter 2 
 Given his extensive travels, surveys, and publications on the arid region west of 
the hundredth meridian, John Wesley Powell was assumed to have articulated a complex 
normative theory that could serve as the basis for alternative Law to manage the Basin.118 
After leading the first documented expeditions into the Grand Canyon via the Colorado 
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Figure 5: Despite acquiring 
extensive scientific knowledge 
of western America in the late 
19th century, John Wesley 
Powell sought to utilize this 
knowledge to ensure the 
country’s materialistic wants 
were met. Reprinted from the 
public domain, Smithsonian 
Institution, Major John Wesley 
Powell at His Desk in the 
Adams Building on F Street, 
N.W., Washington, DC, ca. 
1896, Wikimedia Commons, 
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and Green Rivers (in 1869 and 1871), Powell conducted and directed a multitude of 
surveys that garnered an abundance of data on the arid region’s geology, geography, 
physiography, and topography.119 During his administration of the arid region surveys, 
Powell witnessed land laws fostering westward settlement and economic development 
were ill-suited for the region’s particular climate and geography.120 Powell observed that 
in creating laws that randomly parceled out homesteads into half mile squares (160 
acres), lawmakers ignored the region’s unique environment.121 Western land laws’ 
rampant creation of individual homesteads that completely ignored the dry conditions 
they were situated within led Powell to publish Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of 
the United States With a More Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah, With Maps.122 
Described by Reisner as advocating for settlement of the arid region via cooperation, 
reason, science, and equal sharing of the region’s resources, it was assumed that Powell’s 
valuation of the arid region and nature in general went beyond the market paradigm’s 
economic instrumental valuation of nature.123 Prior to analysis of Report on the Lands 
and the subsequent Century Magazine articles, which built on the report’s ideas, it was 
assumed Powell’s advocacy of settlement via cooperation, reason, and science meant 
there was a place for nature to coexist and flourish alongside humanity.124 
 First published in 1878, Report on the Lands “is an analysis, completely without 
precedent, of the character of the arid lands of the West and of the legislative and legal 
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reforms necessary for proper settlement of the region.”125 In addition to classifying and 
describing the arid region’s lands, Powell recommends two bills that would have led to 
the creation of a land system suitable to the region’s particular climatic and geographic 
conditions and was based on communitarian values.126 Reflecting a vision for the 
settlement of the arid region and the allocation of its resources that differed from the 
norm at the time, Powell built upon and refined this vision in his three Century Magazine 
articles.127 Published twelve years after Report on the Lands, “The Irrigable Lands,” “The 
Non-Irrigable Lands of the Arid Region,” and “Institutions of the Arid Lands” are 
Powell’s fullest articulation of how development in the west ought to occur.128 In them 
Powell details his alternative settlement system for the west and strategizes how to realize 
that vision.129 In crafting a western settlement system that differed from the western land 
laws of his time by acknowledging the unique conditions of the arid region, it was 
presumed this system was premised on a complex reasoning that enabled nature to have 
intrinsic value.  
 Despite envisioning settling the arid region in a manner that showed more regard 
for the region’s climatic and geographic conditions than was the norm at the time, simple 
reasoning underlies Powell’s alternative vision for the west. As evidenced by Report on 
the Lands’ preface, Powell seeks to utilize the region for economic purposes. “It was my 
purpose not only to consider the character of the lands themselves, but also the 
engineering problems involved in their redemption, and further to make suggestions for 
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the legislative action necessary to inaugurate the enterprises by which these lands may 
eventually be rescued from their present worthless state.”130 In wanting to transform the 
land for economic purposes, not only does Powell show he instrumentally values the arid 
region for its economic potential but also his characterization of the region as worthless 
without economic activity highlights he does not view it as having intrinsic value. While 
Powell grasps the region’s natural makeup, he is concerned with making the region 
available for businesses. In recommending legislative action that will foster economic 
activity, Powell shows a commitment to the satisfaction of the peoples’ economic wants, 
a commitment that does not change in between Report on the Lands and the publication 
of the Century Magazine articles. Writing in “The Irrigable Lands of the Arid Region” 
that “not only must these lands be redeemed because of the wants of the population of 
that country, they must be redeemed because they are our best lands,” Powell shows he is 
motivated by wanting to ensure the arid region is utilized to meet the country’s 
wants/desires.131 In this respect Powell is no different from the market paradigm, the 
doctrine, and the Law in that he views the country as comprised of consumers who are 
motivated by desire and must have their materialistic wants satisfied.  
 However, Powell represents a shift in the practical context model that enables the 
market paradigm to remain the status-quo normative argument underlying environmental 
law. As the intermediary between a paradigm and the policy instrument that codifies and 
implements a paradigm, the practical context model132 is a paradigm’s particular 
worldview, organizing the world and its components around to reflect the priorities of its 
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paradigm.133 Within the policy space of the market paradigm’s context model, the 
conceptual space containing the components that represent the paradigm’s worldview, the 
market (representing the operating principle) dominates the space and the remaining 
components are subject to change to enable the market to dominate.134 The doctrine and 
Powell represent two distinct worldviews grounded in the market paradigm, with the 
latter reflecting a rearrangement of the components from the former to enable the 
persistence of the market. Whereas the doctrine’s context model is reflective of 
maximum use of water, Powell is more reflective of optimum use of nature’s resources. 
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Figure 6: Within TSA-I the market dominates the policy space and resources are put to 
maximum utilization for the benefit of society.  
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 Conceived at a time when the country was expanding economically and resources 
were being utilized to maximize individual wealth, the doctrine is representative of the 
first traditional sector approach context model (TSA-I) (Figure 6).135 Since the doctrine 
(represented by the market) was conceived without government input and readily adopted 
by federal and state governments, it dominates the policy space and directs how the 
government and other components should operate.136 Because the doctrine was driven by 
the imperative to utilize water for mining gold (and later for agriculture and other 
activities), they are represented within the model, with water in the “nature’s species” 
component, gold in the “nature’s media” component, and “the economy” representing the 
people and forces that utilized the water to obtain gold. Furthermore, since gold could be 
utilized to obtain other possessions that maximized wealth, it can be represented in the 
“nature’s species” component with “the economy” representing gold’s transformation, 
and “nature’s media” representing the final product of gold’s transformation and the 
waste generated from this transformation.137 Since gold enabled the actualization of 
Kaldor efficiency and gold was only possible from the consumption of water, the doctrine 
placed no restrictions on the amount of water that could be consumed, thus enabling 
maximum consumption of water to maximize the output of gold. This description of how 
the doctrine functioned aligns with Gillroy’s characterization of TSA-I; “TSA-I can be 
described as a market-driven model where the perception of a boundless and unprotected 
nature, combined with the driving force of the normative standard of Kaldor efficiency 
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encourages the maximum use of nature to fuel economic progress.”138 Since the doctrine 
operated in the context of a sparsely populated region, which meant untapped resources, 
the doctrine was representative of utilizing water to increase individual welfare and spur 
economic expansion in a dry region where all economic activity was a function of using 
water. The doctrine’s immediate maximum utilization of water meant prior appropriation, 
and thus TSA-I, did not consider how such utilization might negatively impact the 
market’s future ability to utilize and transform water into goods and services that would 
maximize wealth.139  
 
 Responding to the market’s arbitrary division and allocation of the arid region’s 
resources to enable economic expansion, Powell’s alternative settlement system for the 
                                                            
138 Gillroy, Justice & Nature, 83. 
139 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 175. 
Figure 7: While the market still dominates the policy space in TSA-II, the government now 
intervenes and regulates the market by establishing optimum rates of utilizing natural resources to 
ensure the market can be sustained.  
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region is representative of the second traditional sector approach (TSA-II) (Figure 7), the 
worldview that emerged in the late 19th century.140 Powell’s plan called for the federal 
government to survey the arid region to identify irrigable and pastoral lands for the 
purpose of eventually creating irrigation and pasturage districts, as these districts would 
contain the water needed to sustain human activity in the dry region.141 In calling for the 
federal government to establish pasturage and irrigation districts, Powell was calling on 
the government to regulate how the market transformed the land into products that 
benefitted people, which is representative of TSA-II.142 While the market still dominates 
the policy space, transforming natural resources into goods of value to humans, a balance 
between input and output is attained from government oversight.143 To prevent market 
failure that would occur in TSA-I as a result of unregulated advancing technology and the 
absence of the “true” price of natural resource transformation and disposal, the 
government’s role in TSA-II becomes one of “set[ting] optimal rates of extraction and 
disposal, given the technology available and the natural contingencies of species, 
minerals, and media.”144 By calling for settlement via districts with sufficient water 
supplies and that conformed to the region’s contours, Powell was acknowledging “the 
natural contingencies of species, minerals, and media.”145 In its application to Powell, 
“natural contingencies of species, minerals, and media” refers to the arid region’s 
climate, mountains, and other features impacting the nature of settlement and which the 
government needed to account for to continue enabling economic activity in the region. 
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The land system Powell proposes represents a government accounting for these variables 
(contingencies) and taking a more active role directing the region’s settlement.146 Since 
the creation of irrigation and pasturage districts called for greater government 
intervention (defined in terms of surveying) than was the norm in TSA-I, Powell’s vision 
for the west more closely aligns with TSA-II. To ensure peoples’ wants were satisfied, 
defined by wanting to settle the arid region, Powell’s land system called for government 
to direct how settlement occurred, thus reflecting government intervention characteristic 
of TSA-II.  
 Articulating a refined alternative vision for settling the west in the Century 
Magazine articles, Powell’s vision requires government intervention that is further 
representative of TSA-II. His refined vision calls for settlement via the arid region’s 
naturally occurring hydrographic basins (watersheds), each of which would contain the 
irrigable lands, pastoral lands, forests, and other resources needed to support 
settlement.147 However to actualize this settlement system required the federal 
government sponsor topographic, hydrographic, engineering, and geologic surveys to 
obtain essential information such as pinpointing reservoir sites, identifying irrigable 
lands, and determining canal sites that would enable settlement to proceed.148 
Additionally, Powell tasks the federal government with retaining possession of all lands 
within the basins except the irrigable lands, determining how water is supposed to be 
used on the irrigable lands, and deciding how water ought to be divided among the 
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basins.149 His vision also calls for state governments to establish and regulate water 
rights, institute an inspection system, and create a system of litigation.150 The 
responsibilities Powell assigns to the federal and state governments is representative of 
him taking stock of “natural contingencies of species, minerals, and media” so that he can 
meet the country’s desire for settlement and expansion.151 Powell’s accounting for “the 
natural contingencies of species, minerals, and media” is reflected in the multiple surveys 
he calls for to understand the region’s topography, hydrology, and geography that will 
impact how settlement occurs. In having the federal government extensively survey the 
arid region then assigning the federal and state governments substantial roles in managing 
the region’s settlement, Powell takes a methodical approach in attempting to satisfy the 
country’s wants. This approach is more balanced, characteristic of TSA-II, in that the 
west’s features are accounted for in settling the region and the final product is that 
settlement occurs but within the region’s natural boundaries, as illustrated by Powell’s 
call for settlement via the region’s watersheds. The government’s role becomes one of 
ensuring that settlement is in conformity with the land’s natural features by acquiring the 
necessary data and setting up the proper institutions and regulations. In calling for 
government sponsored surveys and regulations to settle the western U.S., Powell 
represents a reorientation of the market paradigm whereby the market still dominates but 
other components have been rearranged to enable its persistence into the future.152 While 
Powell’s land system was a response to the market’s rampant and arbitrary allocation of 
the west’s resources to meet the country’s wants, fundamentally his argument is still the 
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market paradigm with his land system reflecting a readjustment of the argument in light 
of changing economic conditions.153 
 Given the objective of Powell’s land system is the satisfaction of the country’s 
materialistic wants, Powell is not normatively different from the doctrine and the market 
paradigm, remaining grounded in simple reasoning. Where Powell differs from the 
doctrine is his emphasis on a more planned allocation and utilization of natural resources; 
consequently, whereas Powell was dependent on government intervention to actualize his 
system, the doctrine was reflective of the market operating in its own capacity. While 
differing in terms of worldviews, the doctrine and Powell reflect the market paradigm’s 
economic instrumental valuation of nature. Powell’s clear demonstration of how he 
values the arid region for meeting the country’s materialistic wants means he does not 
represent a normative theory that can serve as an alternative basis for law to manage the 
Colorado River Basin. 
Chapter 3 
 The Subak irrigation system from the Indonesian island of Bali represents an 
alternative water management system whose normative foundation compensates for the 
market paradigm’s inadequacies. An egalitarian and cooperative approach to managing 
water, the Subak system has sustainably utilized the island’s water supply to cultivate rice 
in the province since the 9th century.154 Employing a network of canals, tunnels, and 
weirs constructed from “locally available materials” and built to conform to the land’s 
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natural features, farmers from a Subak155, which may vary in size from 50 to 400 
members, will mutually coordinate with each other to ensure each receives a proportional 
share of water to cultivate rice.156 Subak members mutually assist one another in 
cultivating rice and abide by a set of operational rules covering matters such as members’ 
responsibilities, penalties for rules’ violations, cropping patterns, and water allocation 
methods that have been agreed upon by all members and aid in fostering harmonious 
relations among members.157 From when water is first received to the end of harvesting, 
farmers also conduct religious ceremonies and offer prayers to various deities, including 
and especially the supreme goddess Dewi Danu who is “associated with the life-giving 
properties of water.”158 Because water is a gift from Dewi Danu and water “is revered for 
its power to make things grow and to wash away impurities both physical and spiritual,” 
Subak farmers, and Balinese in general, believe water “should be used fairly for the 
benefit of all.”159 By collectively utilizing an intricate system of canals, tunnels, and 
weirs that are in harmony with the land, distributing water equitably, and continually 
engaging in religious ceremonies to give thanks for the sustenance the land and water 
provides, farmers within the Subak system are able to achieve a balance between the 
social, natural, and spiritual realms.160 The Subak system’s achievement of balance 
between multiple realms reflects an adherence to the Tri Hita Karana philosophy, which 
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assumes truths about nature and social relations that compensate for classical economics’ 
inadequacies.  
 Originating from the primary Hindu scriptures known as the Vedas and the 
secondary Hindu scripture of the Epic Mahabharata, Tri Hita Karana has been the life 
philosophy of the Balinese since at least the 12th century.161 Translated as the “three 
causes of prosperity/happiness,” Tri Hita Karana assumes human prosperity comes from 
attaining and balancing harmony with the spiritual realm, nature, and other humans.162 As 
evidenced by its literal translation and the subsequent explanation, while Tri Hita Karana 
is similar to classical economics in its concern for prosperity, the former assumes 
prosperity is more of a universal goal than the latter’s assumption of prosperity as a 
private goal.163 Although both philosophies are based on simple reasoning (their 
motivation is the satisfaction of the desire for prosperity), Tri Hita Karana assumes 
prosperity can only be achieved via public action whereas classical economics assumes 
prosperity can only be achieved via private action.164 Because Tri Hita Karana assumes 
prosperity requires public action, as illustrated by individuals’ needing to achieve 
harmony with each other, and assumes prosperity is also tied to harmony with nature and 
the spiritual realm, the philosophy assumes a much more comprehensive definition of 
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prosperity than classical economics.165 The philosophy’s assumptions about needing to 
maintain harmonious relations with nature and other humans to achieve prosperity means 
Tri Hita Karana compensates for classical economics’ inadequate assumptions about 
nature and social relations. Utilizing the format from Step A, Component 3 of Figure 3, a 
paradigm of Tri Hita Karana will be conceptualized and contrasted with the market 
paradigm to demonstrate how the philosophy compensates for classical economics’ 
inadequacies. By conceptualizing a Tri Hita Karana paradigm, the paradigm will 
represent an ideal alternative paradigm that could be utilized as the normative basis for 
alternative Law to manage the Colorado River.166 
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 The Tri Hita Karana paradigm’s characterization of the individual as an unselfish 
human devoted to a more sophisticated, and thus more comprehensive, understanding of 
prosperity compensates for the market paradigm’s selfish nature and negation of nature’s 
intrinsic value. Since the philosophy characterizes prosperity as stemming from the 
individual achieving harmonious relations with the spiritual realm, “with his [natural] 
environment, and with other man or his social environment,” prosperity is presumed to be 
the individual’s primary concern.167 Because the individual must balance devotion to the 
spiritual realm, “dedication and mutual service to fellow humans, and maintain the 
welfare of [the] physical [natural] environment based on yadnya [holy sacrifice]” to 
achieve prosperity, the individual must devote him/herself to others to attain prosperity, 
which means forsaking selfish intentions.168 (In the preceding context, holy sacrifice 
refers to the individual serving the spiritual realm, other humans, and nature and giving 
thanks for his/her prosperity.) In acting unselfishly towards others, which includes 
maintaining a harmonious relationship with nature by respecting nature and protecting its 
well-being, the Tri Hita Karana individual recognizes nature’s intrinsic value.169 By 
respecting and protecting nature’s well-being, Tri Hita Karana compensates for the 
market paradigm’s strict economic instrumental valuation of nature for the purpose of 
satisfying individuals’ materialistic preferences. Since the Tri Hita Karana individual is 
presumed to possess an unselfish desire to living a harmonious life by serving the 
spiritual realm, other humans, and nature, the philosophy compensates for the classical 
economics individual’s more selfish understanding of prosperity.  
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 Since Tri Hita Karana assumes the individual desires to achieve prosperity by 
unselfishly serving others, community and collective action in the philosophy assume a 
character analogous to the game theory coordination game. Because the Tri Hita Karana 
individual desires to serve others, when a group of Tri Hita Karana individuals come 
together, the desire to serve others creates a situation akin to the coordination game. 
Described by Gillroy as where simple reasoning (satisfaction of desire) is applied to 
public goals, the individual within coordination game “has but one imperative to receive 
any payoffs: coordinate her choices with the choices of others.”170 In coordination game 
the individual “has only pure rational motivations and pure public goals and therefore has 
no fear of unilateral exploitation nor desire for unilateral exploitation of others, as these 
have no payoffs connected to them. In lieu of exploitation or unilateral gain, the universal 
ends of one’s choices are defined by coordination of one’s behavior with that of 
others.”171 With each Tri Hita Karana individual presuming to mutually love and respect 
one another and willing to help each other out, the individual has no fear of being 
unilaterally exploited “nor desire[s] for unilateral exploitation of others.”172 Because each 
Tri Hita Karana individual desires a harmonious relationship with one another and wishes 
to serve others, each individual will work harmoniously with each other, leading to the 
coordination of actions to realize goals. The Subak system’s longevity of producing rice 
reflects Tri Hita Karana individuals effectively coordinating with each other the precise 
release of water from the intricate system of weirs, dams, and canals for the cultivation of 
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rice.173 Because the individual is willing to coordinate his/her actions with others, the Tri 
Hita Karana paradigm’s coordination game compensates for the market paradigm’s 
prisoner’s dilemma where the individual prefers to act selfishly due to desiring 
satisfaction of privately held goals.174 Because individuals within the community prefer 
to serve one another’s interests, the unselfish Tri Hita Karana community compensates 
for classical economics’ selfish community where individuals prefer to serve and satisfy 
their own preferences.  
 With Tri Hita Karana individuals desiring prosperity and willing to serve each 
other to achieve prosperity, the state practically has no role to play in helping individuals 
achieve their objective. Because everyone within the Tri Hita Karana community is 
willing to act in a universal manner, because each individual desires a harmonious 
relationship with and is willing to cooperate with each other, the community becomes “a 
self-sustaining cooperative equilibrium producing social convention.”175 As a result of 
the Tri Hita Karana community establishing social convention, due to individuals sharing 
the same objective and willing to cooperate with each other to achieve it, the state has no 
role to play in assisting individuals achieve their objective. As highlighted by the state 
having no role within the Subak system, the state has no role within Tri Hita Karana 
because individuals not only conceive policy but also cooperate with each other in its 
realization and enforcement, leaving the state with no role to fill.176 In this respect, the 
state has a lesser role than the market paradigm’s state; however, whereas disharmony 
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characterizes the market paradigm because selfish interests dominate and a minimum 
level of harmony/cooperation is established via state intervention, harmony occurs 
naturally within the Tri Hita Karana paradigm because unselfish interests dominate and 
individuals are willing to cooperate with each other to achieve them.177 Thus, the state 
within Tri Hita Karana has no need to intervene to establish harmony or assist in the 
realization of the policy’s objective because the individuals themselves will cooperate 
with each other to achieve it. While the state not having a role within the Tri Hita Karana 
paradigm may appear to handicap the paradigm’s capacity to compensate for the market 
paradigm’s inadequacies, the philosophy’s assumptions about the individual and 
collective action are what allow its paradigm to compensate for the market paradigm’s 
inadequacies. Since assumptions about individual and collective interests will dictate 
“what kinds of environmental policies the state ought to adopt,” it’s the Tri Hita Karana 
paradigm’s assumptions of the individual as an unselfish human devoted to a more 
comprehensive understanding of prosperity and collective action as resembling the 
coordination game that enables the paradigm to compensate for the market paradigm’s 
inadequate assumptions about the individual as a self-interested consumer and collective 
action as resembling the prisoner’s dilemma.178 
 Because the individual desires prosperity, which again is defined as the individual 
living a balanced life by maintaining harmonious relations with the spiritual realm, 
nature, and other humans, policy and law will be judged by where they establish and/or 
maintain harmony.179 Since the operating principle is the shorthand for what is right and 
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is derived in part from the cornerstone of any paradigm, characterization of the Tri Hita 
Karana individual as essentially seeking harmony means harmony sets “the standard that 
will define what is right.”180 Consequently, potential policy and law needs to establish 
harmony or avoid upsetting the harmony that exists between individuals and their 
relations with the spiritual realm, nature, and other humans in order to be considered 
right. Because the individual needs to balance harmonious relationships with the spiritual 
realm, nature, and other humans to attain prosperity, the presumption is that each 
relationship is intertwined with each other, which means disturbing one harmonious 
relationship will disturb the harmony of the remaining relationships.181 Because harmony 
is premised on each relationship being intertwined with one another, and thereby equal to 
one another, harmony as an operating principle compensates for the inequality of Kaldor 
efficiency. Whereas Kaldor efficiency only requires individuals with wealth to 
hypothetically compensate those with no wealth, harmony requires individuals 
unselfishly serve other’s interests, thereby ensuring everyone actually benefits from each 
other’s actions.182 Whereas Kaldor efficiency is concerned with maximizing net 
collective wealth and is indifferent to the unequal distribution of wealth, which creates 
unbalanced and tenuous relationships between those with wealth and those without 
wealth, the operating principle of harmony compensates for this inadequacy by ensuring 
all individuals are able to maintain harmonious relations with the spiritual realm, nature, 
and each other.183 By ensuring policy does not disturb the harmonious relations 
individuals have with the spiritual realm, nature, and other humans, the operating 
                                                            
180 Gillroy, Justice & Nature, 20. 
181 Peters and Wardana, Tri Hita Karana, 104. 
182 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 164. 
183 Ibid. 
 50 
principle of harmony will ensure all individuals’ desire for mental and physical 
prosperity is fulfilled.184 
 However, protecting the individual’s capacity to attain and maintain harmonious 
relations with the spiritual realm, nature, and other humans will require taking advantage 
of different material conditions. Since humanity’s relationship with nature is analogous to 
“a fetus in a womb” whereby “any damage to the womb will certainly endanger the fetus 
itself,” nature ought to be conserved whereby nature is utilized to meet the individual’s 
materialistic needs but not to the extent that nature’s intrinsic value is violated thereby 
disrupting its instrumental value to humanity and harming humanity’s own intrinsic 
value.185 Whereas conservation ought to enable the individual to maintain a harmonious 
relationship with nature, service to others ought to allow the individual to maintain 
harmony with other humans. Since all humans are of one humanity because all humans 
are presumed equal to one another, to harm or serve one human means harming or 
serving all of humanity; thus, for the individual to nurture the love and respect essential 
to attaining harmony with humanity requires serving and cooperating with others to 
achieve their own needs.186 By utilizing a different material condition to nurture each 
harmonious relationship essential to achieving prosperity, the Tri Hita Karana paradigm 
compensates for the market paradigm’s utilization of a single material condition to 
represent a single value. Because the market paradigm monetizes all resources, property, 
and other things to represent their economic instrumental value, the Tri Hita Karana 
                                                            
184 Peters and Wardana, Tri Hita Karana, 81. 
185 Sutawan, Tri Hita Karana and Subak, 2. 
186 “Tri Hita Karana: Three Balinese Wisdom Concept,” Bali Travel Guide, accessed February 13, 2016, 
http://www.baliaround.com/tri-hita-karana-three-balinese-wisdom-concept/; Peters and Wardana, Tri Hita 
Karana, 81. 
 51 
paradigm compensates for this inadequacy, utilizing different material conditions that 
accommodate multiple values.187 While serving others and conserving nature to attain 
one’s own prosperity signifies they’re instrumentally valuable to the individual, service to 
others and conservation of nature also accommodates their intrinsic values by 
recognizing other humans and nature must be allowed to flourish in their own capacity to 
be of use to the individual. With service and conservation at his/her disposal, the Tri Hita 
Karana policy-maker has an assortment of material conditions he/she can manipulate to 
ensure individuals’ relations with others and nature remain harmonious.188 
 As the Tri Hita Karana paradigm’s maxim, “Maintain Harmony” checks the 
disharmony and unrestrained human activity stemming from the market paradigm’s 
maxim of maximizing wealth. Since individuals desire prosperity and prosperity is 
premised on harmony with others, the maxim implores the Tri Hita Karana policy-maker 
to make law and policy decisions based on whether they will maintain the spiritual, 
natural, and social conditions necessary for individuals achieving and/or maintaining 
harmonious relations with the spiritual realm, nature, and each other. Embodied within 
the maxim of maintaining harmony is the notion of self-control whereby maintaining 
harmony with the spiritual realm, nature, and others means human activity cannot 
proceed if harmony is disrupted in any one relationship, thereby disrupting the overall 
harmony needed to achieve prosperity.189 By implicitly calling for self-control, the Tri 
Hita Karana paradigm’s maxim compensates for the maximization of wealth, which 
fosters tension among individuals and deterioration of the natural world. Whereas the 
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market paradigm allows individuals to pursue activities to maximize collective wealth, 
which creates tension between those who succeed and possess wealth and those who do 
not, the Tri Hita Karana paradigm ensures no activity is pursued that creates inequality 
among individuals and thereby tension. Furthermore, whereas the market paradigm 
allows nature to deteriorate so long as the deterioration does not interfere with the 
satisfaction and maximization of individuals’ preferences, the Tri Hita Karana paradigm 
will not allow activities that cause nature to deteriorate since nature’s intrinsic value 
would be violated and thereby create disharmony.190 In knowing his/her objective is to 
maintain harmony, the Tri Hita Karana policy-maker is compelled to make law and 
policy decisions that restrict human activities to avoid disrupting the harmony that 
exists/should exist between individuals and the spiritual realm, nature, and each other. 
 By evaluating a proposed law or policy in terms of whether it would disturb 
spiritual, natural, and social harmony, the Tri Hita Karana policy-maker would be 
conducting a more comprehensive analysis than if the cost-benefit methodology were 
utilized. To evaluate whether a potential law/policy maintains harmony between 
individuals and the spiritual realm, nature, and each other, the Tri Hita Karana policy-
maker would need to, at a minimum, conduct a spiritual analysis, an ecological analysis, 
and a social relations analysis. In conducting an ecological analysis of a proposed 
law’s/policy’s potential impact on the ecological systems and conditions that enable 
individuals to have a harmonious relationship with nature, the policy-maker would be 
able to determine if a proposed law/policy adheres to the Tri Hita Karana paradigm’s 
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operating principle.191 However, determining whether the proposed law/policy adheres to 
the Tri Hita Karana paradigm’s operating principle cannot be accomplished without also 
conducting a social relations analysis to examine whether harmony among individuals 
and the conditions that support this harmony would be disturbed by the proposed 
law/policy. In evaluating a proposed law/policy based on the results of an ecological 
analysis and a social relations analysis as well as a spiritual analysis (to determine if the 
proposed law/policy disturbs individuals’ sense of spirituality), the Tri Hita Karana 
policy-maker would be adhering to a higher standard of evaluating law/policy than 
merely evaluating it to determine if it monetarily benefits society. Whereas the market 
paradigm subordinates nature to society to ensure nature economically benefits society, 
the Tri Hita Karana paradigm compensates for this inadequacy, as evidenced by the 
harmony that must exist between nature and society (humanity) because both are equal to 
each other and therefore must be valued in the same capacity.192 Furthermore, whereas 
the market paradigm assumes “any large [monetary] gain, even one that causes massive 
misdistribution of wealth” is justifiable so long as “the hypothetical possibility of 
compensation exists,” the Tri Hita Karana paradigm compensates for this legitimized 
inequality by presuming all humans are equal to each other and should serve each other’s 
interests, which will ensure the equitable distribution of wealth.193 In utilizing various 
analyses to determine the potential ecological, social, and spiritual changes of a proposed 
law or policy, the Tri Hita Karana paradigm (Figure 9) is a more comprehensive 
paradigm than the market paradigm due to the former’s concern for matters extending 
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beyond determining whether a proposed law or policy would monetarily benefit or cost 
individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tri Hita Karana’s characterization of the individual as devoted to serving the 
spiritual realm, nature, and others to achieve his/her prosperity embodies qualities that 
ought to characterize the alternative paradigm that normatively serves as the foundation 
for alternative Law to manage the Colorado River.194 In characterizing the individual as 
serving others, Tri Hita Karana represents the game theory coordination game, the most 
ideal form of collective action that ought to characterize the alternative Law drafted to 
manage the Colorado River whereby individuals go from serving private (selfish) 
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interests to serving public (unselfish) interests.195 However, because coordination game is 
the most ideal form of collective action, which can characterize law, the Law cannot be 
changed from the status-quo prisoner’s dilemma to coordination game without prisoner’s 
dilemma evolving to a game of chicken to assurance game to coordination game or 
evolving to assurance game to coordination game.196 While the philosophy is too ideal to 
be utilized to conceive alternative Law that could manage the Colorado River, the 
philosophy nonetheless embodies assumptions that ought to characterize the normative 
theory ultimately utilized to conceive alternative Law. To ensure prosperity, minimize 
tension, and foster cooperation among the River’s users, the alternative normative theory 
chosen to formulate alternative Law should compel individuals to transition from 
focusing on private goals to focusing on public goals, similar to Tri Hita Karana 
presuming prosperity comes from individuals serving each other. In transitioning from 
focusing on private goals to public goals, individuals would be exposed to and compelled 
to consider other values besides selfish economic interests, such as nature’s intrinsic 
value or nature’s intrinsic value being instrumentally valuable to humanity, as illustrated 
by Tri Hita Karana recognizing nature nourishes humanity, which necessitates nature be 
allowed to flourish to be instrumentally valuable to humanity. Thus, the alternative 
normative theory chosen to formulate alternative Law must be more complex in the sense 
that values other than private (selfish) economic interests are considered. 
Chapter Four 
 In light of “the twenty-first century pos[ing] a plethora of problems, none of 
which could have been envisioned by the drafters of the Colorado River Compact in 
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1922,” a revised Compact grounded in a complex normative theory will allow the Law to 
effectively address problems that are currently beyond the status-quo’s scope.197 As the 
Law of the River’s keystone, the Colorado River Compact established the Law’s 
character and framework subsequent compacts, contracts, court decisions, and regulations 
built on, which means any fundamental change that needs to occur must originate with 
the Compact.198 Since the Basin faces a plethora of problems stemming from the 
Compact’s fixation on economic development, a complex normative theory needs to 
enable the creation of a revised Compact with provisions embodying values and 
principles that can effectively address these problems.199 A revised Compact needs to 
contain provisions that harmonize the River’s intrinsic and economic instrumental uses 
(values), coordinates individual economic uses, and compels all uses to synchronize with 
the Basin becoming drier and having less water. Outlined in the subsequent paragraphs 
are provisions that ought to be included in a revised Compact to move the Law away 
from the market paradigm’s selfish economic valuation of the River and more towards 
Tri Hita Karana’s notions of harmony between humanity and nature and harmony among 
humans. While Tri Hita Karana itself cannot replace the status-quo because of its 
incompatibility with American political and religious culture, the provisions’ attempts to 
harmonize relations among humans and between humanity and nature have legal 
precedence and/or public support within the U.S. Given the Colorado River “is virtually 
the sole dependable water supply” for not only 36 million people but also multiple flora 
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and fauna species, the provisions are designed to ensure there is enough water for all life 
in America’s driest region.200 
 With the River’s annual flow predicted to decrease as a result of climate change, 
decreasing as little as 6% to as much as 45%, a provision acknowledging the River’s 
reduced annual flow needs to serve as the cornerstone of a revised Colorado River 
Compact.201 Since all activity (intrinsic and instrumental) in the Basin is dependent on 
access to water, a provision acknowledging the River’s reduced annual flow will 
establish the context for effectively allocating water to enable activity. As the cornerstone 
of a revised Compact, such a provision will establish less water will be available to 
allocate, thus all life and activity will have to adapt to there being less water. Such a 
provision would likely have public support as a survey conducted by James Pritchett et 
al. shows residents in the western U.S. perceive there is not enough water in the region to 
meet their current and future needs, which suggests they realize they will have to adjust 
to there being less water.202 To insure available water allows for the Basin’s intrinsic 
value and peoples’ economic instrumental uses to exist, allocations for these values will 
have to fluctuate with the River’s projected annual flow. In making a provision 
acknowledging the River’s reduced flow the keystone of a revised Compact, emphasis 
shifts from exclusive economic consumption of the River to recognition that allocations 
to enable intrinsic and instrumental uses will need to vary with the River’s flow. Without 
accounting for the River’s diminished flow, attempts to enable the Basin’s flora and 
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fauna to thrive while maintaining some degree of economic activity will be futile since 
intrinsic and instrumental uses in the arid Region can only occur with access to water.203 
Recognizing allocations will need to fluctuate with the River’s decreased flow is a step 
towards harmonizing humanity’s relationship with the River and relations among 
individuals because the provision would give greater consideration to the River than is 
currently the norm and would acknowledge a condition that will impact all activities in 
the Region. 
 To minimize growing tension over competition for a reduced water supply, a 
revised Compact ought to contain a provision creating an agency that will facilitate 
cooperation throughout the entire Basin. Similar to the Upper Colorado River Basin 
Compact’s creation of a commission to manage allocations in the Upper Basin and 
Arizona v. California’s designation of the Secretary of the Interior as the Lower Basin’s 
water master, a revised Compact ought to establish and charge an administrative agency 
with allocating and managing the Basin’s water supply.204 Since division of the Basin and 
the mandate requiring the Upper Basin ensure the Lower Basin receive 75 maf over “any 
period of 10 consecutive years” has created tension between the sub-basins, a 
commission comprised of a member from each Basin state and the federal government 
ought to manage the entire Basin’s water supply.205 Charging an interstate commission 
with allocating the Basin’s water would compel the Upper and Lower Basin states to 
reconcile and obligate members to cooperate with each other, thereby checking the self-
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interests of each member state and ensuring no member receives an unfair portion of the 
River’s water. By creating an administrative agency responsible for managing the entire 
Basin’s water supply, a revised Compact would foster cooperation by ensuring each 
member state bears a proportional burden during times of drought and receives a 
proportional benefit during times of plentiful supply. With climate change reducing the 
Basin’s water supply and each basin and each state coveting remaining supplies, a Basin 
wide commission would compel member states to work together to ensure each state 
more fairly benefits from decisions made regarding the allocation of the Basin’s 
remaining supplies. By compelling all Basin states to work together in a commission 
responsible for allocating the entire Basin’s water supply, a revised Compact should 
harmonize relations among the states because the Basin would be treated holistically and 
water would need to be allocated in a more proportional manner.  
 To meet the Basin’s environmental needs, a provision ought to mandate a 
percentage of water be left in the River for the Basin’s flora and fauna. Legal precedent 
and public support exist for the creation of a provision that would allocate a percentage of 
water exclusively for the Basin’s flora and fauna. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act allows 
Congress or the Secretary of the Interior to designate a river as free flowing (“without 
any diversion impoundment or other modification structures”) if it’s deemed to have 
significant cultural, natural, or recreational value.206 Three of the River’s tributaries have 
been designated as free-flowing: the Fossil Creek and Verde Rivers in Arizona and the 
Virgin River in Utah.207 Additional legal precedent is found in Minute 319, an addendum 
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to the U.S.-Mexican water treaty of 1944.208 Under the agreement signed in 2012, 
105,392 acre-feet of the River’s water was allowed to flow from the Morelos Dam on the 
Arizona-Mexico border to the Gulf of California in 2014, which temporarily restored the 
Colorado River delta to a healthy state.209 Minute 319 also stipulates an additional 52,000 
acre-feet of the River’s water “will be used to actively restore a few select places on the 
delta.”210 In addition to the existence of legal precedent supporting nature’s intrinsic 
value, the survey conducted by Pritchett et al. found western residents believe wildlife 
ought to be provided with water, even in times of drought, and consider nature to be just 
as or more important than the economy in the water allocation decision-making 
process.211 The survey’s findings demonstrate western residents recognize nature has 
intrinsic value and believe it ought to be protected, as illustrated by their willingness to 
allocate water to nature during drought and at the expense of the economy, which means 
a provision allocating water for the Basin’s flora and fauna would align with westerners’ 
values. A revised Compact with a provision allocating a percentage of River water for the 
Basin’s ecosystem would also shift the Law’s orientation from simply enabling 
humanity’s consumption of the River to needing to balance consumption of the River 
with protecting the Basin’s intrinsic value.  
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 To balance protecting the Basin’s intrinsic value and still enabling consumption 
of the River, a provision ought to encourage farmers to plant less water intensive crops, 
utilize more water efficient equipment, and reduce livestock operations. Since the 
Colorado’s annual flow will be reduced and a percentage of water will need to be left in 
the riverbed to meet the Basin’s environmental needs, a provision ought to stipulate the 
reduced percentage of water allocated to the agricultural sector be utilized to the most 
effective capacity possible by adopting the prescribed measures. With River water 
utilized to annually support 15% of the nation’s crops including 80% of the nation’s 
winter crops, 13% of U.S. livestock, and westerners unwilling to relinquish allocating 
water to agriculture during drought, agriculture cannot be abandoned in a region that will 
become drier in the future.212 Thus, to maintain farming operations with less water than 
has historically been made available, a provision ought to encourage farmers adopt more 
efficient methods, such as shifting to the cultivation of drought tolerant crops, utilizing 
drip irrigation systems, and gradually phasing out livestock operations (since raising 
livestock is more water intensive than raising crops).213 Of the prescribed methods, the 
middle option should at least be readily accepted since over 80% of the respondents in 
Pritchett’s survey agreed equipment that conserves water ought to be installed on 
farms.214 By encouraging the agricultural sector to adopt more water efficient methods, a 
revised Compact would be engendering the sector to learn to function with less water and 
freeing up water to enable the Basin’s intrinsic value. Since agriculture consumes nearly 
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80% of Colorado River water, with most of it utilized to cultivate water intensive crops 
such as alfalfa, forage, and hay, a revised Compact fostering adoption of water efficient 
practices would free up water that can be utilized to restore populations of the Basin’s 
flora and fauna.215 
 However, to minimize tension and maintain fairness between the agricultural 
sector and the River’s other primary user, a provision ought to encourage the urban sector 
to adopt water-efficient practices.216 As the River’s flow has diminished, tension has 
increasingly developed between the agricultural and urban sectors as they compete 
against each other to secure remaining supplies for their own needs.217, To minimize 
tension and ensure there is enough water for the agricultural and urban sectors as well as 
the Basin’s ecosystem, a revised Compact ought to encourage the urban sector to adopt 
water efficient practices. By encouraging the urban sector to adopt water efficient 
practices, the agricultural sector would be reassured both sectors were being treated in an 
equal manner to enable and protect the Basin’s intrinsic value while still enabling their 
own consumption of the River. The agricultural sector would be reassured its competitor 
was being encouraged in the same capacity to operate with the availability of less water 
rather than using the water the agricultural sector saved from its own adoption of water 
efficient practices. The survey conducted by Pritchett et al. suggests the urban sector 
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would readily adopt water efficient practices, as respondents recorded during short and 
long term water scarcity they would be willing to institute measures such as restricting 
private and public landscape watering, reusing water on public landscapes, and requiring 
in-home conservation.218 With over 95% of respondents stating they held non-agricultural 
occupations, the survey’s results suggest a provision encouraging the urban sector to 
embrace water efficient practices would have public support, thereby assuring an 
additional percentage of water would not be consumed by the River’s other major user, 
additional water that could be utilized to support the Basin’s ecosystem.219 While such a 
provision would harmonize relations between the urban and agricultural sectors by 
reassuring the latter both sectors are treated in the same manner in order to protect the 
Basin’s ecosystem while still allowing both sectors to prosper, harmony cannot fully be 
realized without limiting the urban sector’s growth. 
 While urging the agricultural and urban sectors to reduce their consumption of 
water via water efficient practices is essential to establishing harmony with the Basin’s 
ecosystem and harmony between the two sectors, harmony cannot fully be realized unless 
population growth in the Region is regulated. With the River’s flow projected to decrease 
and a revised Compact urging the agricultural and urban sectors to reduce their 
consumption so enough water can be reallocated for consumption by the Basin’s 
ecosystem, the Region’s population needs to be regulated to insure enough water is 
available to meet the Basin’s environmental, agricultural, and urban needs. Without 
regulating population growth, water saved by the agricultural and urban sectors’ practices 
will be consumed by either people moving to or being born in the Region, leading to the 
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unavailability of water for the Basin’s ecosystem and inciting tension between the 
agricultural and urban sectors as the former would perceive the latter is not actually 
conserving water. Thus, a provision should stipulate the Basin’s human population, 
which is most likely to be concentrated in urban areas, cannot surpass the Region’s 
carrying capacity.220 By stipulating the Basin’s population cannot grow more than the 
Basin’s capacity to accommodate environmental, agricultural, and urban usage of the 
River, a revised Compact would insure harmony is achieved between intrinsic 
(environmental) and instrumental (agricultural and urban) usage of the River. Though 
restricting growth would conflict with the stereotypical western belief in unlimited 
growth, Pritchett’s survey found westerners actually support government policies curbing 
urban growth during drought.221 Given the Basin is projected to experience drought in the 
future, a provision limiting the Basin’s population so the Basin’s carrying capacity is not 
exceeded would be similar to residents supporting the restriction of urban growth “to a 
level that is supported by a sustainable water supply” during drought.222 By regulating 
urban growth in the Colorado River Basin and adopting the other prescribed provisions, a 
revised Colorado River Compact would minimize tension arising from the status-quo’s 
unchecked demand of a finite resource that will become scarce in the future and establish 
greater harmony between intrinsic and instrumental use of the Colorado River.  
Conclusion 
 In a region where the Colorado River and its tributaries are the basis for life and 
activity, water from the Colorado River is becoming scarce, contributing to the Basin’s 
                                                            
220 Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, and Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion,” 46. 
221 Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, and Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion,” 36; 
Pritchett et al., Public Perceptions, Preferences and Values for Water in the West, 15 and 22. 
222 Pritchett et al., Public Perceptions, Preferences and Values for Water in the West, 14. 
 65 
ecological decline, and generating tension among its users. While a 16-year plus drought 
has deprived the River of water essential to life and activity, the Basin’s ecological 
decline and growing tension among users stems more from the over-appropriation of the 
River’s water exclusively for human consumption. Since the 1922 signing of the 
Colorado River Compact, the River’s water has been appropriated solely for humanity’s 
consumption, leaving no water for the Basin’s ecosystem and straining relations among 
users as more people demand and compete against each other for a finite resource that is 
diminishing.223 As the cornerstone of the regulatory guidelines, laws, court decisions, and 
compacts collectively known as the Law of the River, the Colorado River Compact has 
facilitated consumption of the River’s entire water supply. Despite increasing calls to 
leave water in the River to meet the Basin’s environmental needs and recognition that 
growing demand is outstripping supply, the Law is incapable of accommodating this new 
demand and view.224 The Law’s inability to allocate water for the Basin’s ecosystem and 
prevent tension from arising over consumption exceeding supplies is reflective of its 
inadequate underlying normative argument. 
 Unlike traditional legal analysis, which understands law verbatim and accepts law 
as capable of originating only from market assumptions and principles, policy design 
assumes argument formulated from any integrated normative theory can be the basis for 
law.225 Policy design assumes law is essentially codified normative argument comprised 
of normative assumptions, normative principle, and experience, with change in the law 
occurring by altering the argument’s assumptions, which contrasts with the traditional 
                                                            
223 Hardin, “Demographics, Economy, and Agriculture Depend on Water Storage and Diversion,” 35. 
224 Ibid., 49. 
225 Gillroy, Holland, and Campbell-Mohn, A Primer for Law & Policy Design, 14-15; Gillroy, Justice & 
Nature, 14. 
 66 
approach of relying solely on “market assumptions and economic/quantitative analysis” 
for all law-making decisions.226 Comprehensive policy argument (CPA) is policy 
design’s inductive and deductive process that not only guides the creation of argument 
from a normative theory and its transformation into eventual law but also directs how to 
determine an existing law’s normative argument.227 The market paradigm is assumed to 
be the Compact’s, and thus the Law’s, underlying normative argument since market 
assumptions and principles are acknowledged as dominating legal analysis and decision-
making within environmental and natural resource law.228 In accepting law as 
fundamentally reflective of a paradigm formulated from a normative theory, such as the 
market paradigm from classical economics, policy design assumes an alternative 
normative theory can replace the status-quo if the status-quo argument is deemed 
inadequate.229 
 Grounded in classical economics, the market paradigm’s assumption of the 
individual as “a self-interested welfare maximize” renders the Compact and the Law 
incapable of allocating water for the Basin’s ecosystem and checking growing 
consumption for a finite resource.230 As the keystone of the market paradigm, and thus 
the keystone of the Compact and the Law, the assumption of the individual as a selfish 
welfare maximizer means the Law’s purpose is to ensure individuals’ material 
preferences are satisfied and maximized.231 The satisfaction and maximization of material 
preferences reflects acting on desire (simple reasoning), which values everything 
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instrumentally for the purpose of maximizing personal welfare.232 The Law’s grounding 
in simple reasoning means the Law cannot accommodate other values, such as the 
River’s intrinsic value or inherently limit selfish consumption. Since the Law allows for 
maximum consumption of the River to satisfy individuals’ material preferences, an 
alternative normative theory grounded in complex reasoning is needed to serve as the 
basis for alternative Law that can more effectively manage the Colorado River. 
Accommodating instrumental and intrinsic values, complex reasoning is driven by a 
sense of morality/virtue, the individual acting upon either value based on an analysis of 
the situation.233 Because simple reasoning has caused the River’s over-appropriation, the 
Compact needs to be revised on the basis of complex reasoning to curb instrumental 
valuation and recognize the River’s intrinsic value. Since the River’s over-appropriation 
began with the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the document needs to be redrafted 
utilizing a normative theory that results in the harmonization of the River’s instrumental 
and intrinsic values.234 
 Given his extensive travels and scientific knowledge of western America, it was 
presumed late 19th century U.S. explorer John Wesley Powell’s ideas for settlement of the 
west represented a normative theory that balanced nature’s instrumental and intrinsic 
values. First conveyed in Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States and 
refined in three Century Magazine articles, Powell envisioned western settlement 
occurring in a manner that conformed to the region’s natural features. Prior to analysis, it 
was assumed Powell’s call for western settlement to conform to the region’s natural 
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features meant that he recognized nature’s intrinsic value and his settlement system 
reconciled nature’s instrumental and intrinsic values. However, an analysis of Powell’s 
settlement systems demonstrates the system is still fundamentally reflective of the market 
paradigm and simple reasoning, instrumentally valuing nature for the purpose of 
maximizing personal welfare. While Powell and the Compact are reflective of the market 
paradigm, the system utilized within the Compact to allocate the River to maximize 
welfare required minimal government intervention whereas Powell’s system depended on 
government intervention to ensure welfare was satisfied. The shift from minimal to 
increased government intervention to ensure personal preferences are satisfied reflects a 
reorganization of the world’s components to guarantee the market paradigm is actualized. 
While Powell articulated a settlement system that was more respectable of the land than 
was the norm at the time, its purpose was to satisfy the country’s materialistic wants, 
making him still representative of the market paradigm.235  
 Tri Hita Karana embodies the philosophical characteristics that ought to be part of 
the normative theory that is utilized to revise the Colorado River Compact. Balancing 
instrumental and intrinsic values, Tri Hita Karana presupposes individual prosperity 
manifests from maintaining a harmonious interdependent relationship with the spiritual 
realm, the natural world, and other humans. Tri Hita Karana assumes a more balanced 
definition of welfare than the market paradigm by presuming individual welfare 
(instrumental value) is in part a product of recognizing nature’s and other humans’ 
intrinsic values and allowing each value to thrive. Thus, Tri Hita Karana integrates 
instrumental and intrinsic values in a manner that ought to be characteristic of the 
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alternative normative theory utilized to revise the Colorado River Compact. The notion of 
welfare being in part dependent on maintaining a harmonious relationship with the 
spiritual realm renders the philosophy incompatible with American environmental law 
and U.S. law in general. However, a normative theory similar to Tri Hita Karana ought to 
lead to the creation of provisions within a revised Compact that balance instrumental and 
intrinsic values by curbing the various forms of consumption and allowing instream flows 
to meet the Basin’s environmental needs. 
 The Basin’s deterioration from over-consumption necessitates the Law be revised, 
starting with the Colorado River Compact, so as to check and harmonize the River’s 
instrumental value with its intrinsic value. With climate change compounding 
overconsumption’s effects on the Basin, a revised Compact needs to not only effectively 
integrate the River’s instrumental and intrinsic values but also establish a framework that 
will enable these values to thrive against the backdrop of climate change.236 Since the 
traditional approach to law-making operates entirely on the basis of instrumental value, 
policy design offers the prospect of utilizing any one of existing normative theories for 
revising the Compact to establish a framework that will direct how the River’s 
instrumental and intrinsic values can adapt to and flourish in spite of climate change. As 
laborious as revising the Compact will be, the River’s significance to all life in the 
southwest demands human consumption be checked so the River’s ecosystem can 
recover and adapt to drier conditions. By allowing the River’s ecosystem to recover, 
adapt to, and hopefully thrive amidst climate change, a revised Compact would still allow 
the River to be of use to humanity. With over-consumption the source of its deterioration 
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and its future fraught with uncertainty due to climate change, policy design can redraft 
the Law into a flexible framework that establishes balance between the Colorado River’s 
human users and the Region’s fauna and flora and ensures all forms of life can prosper in 
the Southwest’s most precious ecosystem.  
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